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CIVIL PROCEDURE - ANNULMENT OF EXECUTORY
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SALE
Defendant, endorsee of a note and chattel mortgage secur-
ing the purchase price of an automobile bought by plaintiff,
successfully enforced the mortgage under executory proceedings
without authentic evidence of the endorsement. Although plain-
tiff apparently had proper notice of the proceedings,1 he made
no appearance to appeal from the order of seizure or enjoin the
sale, and the automobile was sold to a third party.2 Shortly
thereafter, defendant procured a deficiency judgment against
plaintiff by default. More than three years after the sale, plain-
tiff, alleging lack of authentic evidence of the endorsement of
the note to defendant, sued to annul both the executory pro-
ceedings and the deficiency judgment. 3 Plaintiff did not seek
to recover the automobile but prayed for damages for its wrong-
ful seizure. The trial court held for defendant, but the First
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. Held, an executory proceed-
ing which is null because based on insufficient authentic evi-
dence can be attacked after the sale in a suit by the mortgagor
against the instigator of the proceedings who knew of the
defect and was responsible for it, although the mortgagor failed
to enjoin the sale or appeal from the order of seizure. 4 Tapp v.
1. It is not explicitly stated in the opinion that notice was given, but since
no complaint of lack of notice was made, it will be assumed that notice was
served.
2. The court said "Guaranty Finance obtained an order for executory process,
seized and sold the automobile with appraisement." 158 So. 2d at 229. Though
there is no specific indication to whom the car was sold, the language quoted
indicates it was adjudicated to a third party.
3. The primary aim of plaintiff's suit was to annul the deficiency judg-
ment and to enjoin the garnishment of his wages obtained by defendant in
satisfaction thereof. 158 So. 2d at 231. However, nullity of the deficiencyjudgment was predicated on the contention that the executory proceeding, in-
cluding the appraisement, was null, and consequently the deficiency judgment
was in violation of LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950). See note 4 infra for a more
extensive treatment of the court's holding on this point.
4. Plaintiff's claim for damages for wrongful seizure was characterized as a
tort action and held barred by prescription of one year. 158 So. 2d at 236.
Although no plea of prescription was entered against the action to annul the
executory proceedings, it is possible such a plea would have been successful
under Louisiana Civil Code article 3543 (quoted note 15 infra) which pro-
vides for a prescription of two years against informalities in or connected
with public sales. See note 25 infra for further discussion of this point.
The court's subsequent holding that the deficiency judgment was null is beyond
the scope of this Note, but a brief explanation and comment are in order. The
court held that since the executory proceeding was null in toto, the appraise-
ment of the automobile was invalid, and the sale was one "without the bene-
fit of appraisement" under LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950), which prohibits a creditor
who has taken advantage of a waiver of appraisement, and provoked a judicial
sale without appraisement, from later obtaining a deficiency judgment against
1964] NOTES
Guaranty Finance Co., 158 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 160 So. 2d 228 (La. 1964).
Executory process is an ex parte proceeding which may be
employed by a creditor to enforce a mortgage or other privilege
evidenced by an act importing a confession of judgment.5 The
creditor must produce authentic evidence of his right to invoke
the proceeding, including authentic proof of the underlying
obligation, the mortgage or privilege, and any endorsement or
transfer thereof.6 An order of sale under executory process
the debtor. 158 So. 2d at 234-35. The statute was construed to be a law of
public policy absolutely prohibiting "a mortgagee or other creditor from pro-
ceeding against the debtor or any other of his property for any deficiency
judgment in the absence of a legal appraisement." 158 So. 2d at 234. It was
concluded the deficiency judgment was absolutely null, id. at 234-35, and was
subject to attack under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2004, which
authorizes annulment of judgments obtained by "ill practice." Id. at 233. Con-
ceding article 2004 applies to a judgment rendered in violation of a prohibitory
law, see Ciluffa v. Monreale Realty Co., 209 La. 333, 24 So. 2d 606 (1945);
Phillips v. Bryan, 172 La. 269, 134 So. 88 (1931), the application of R.S.
13:4106 to the situation of the instant case appears questionable. The statute
was designed to protect the debtor against the unfair practice of a creditor's
procuring a waiver of appraisement, selling the property at much less than
its value and then suing the debtor for the deficiency. See Soileau v. Pitre,
79 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955) ; Futch v. Gregory, 40 So. 2d 830 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1949); Southland Inv. Co. v. Lofton, 194 So. 125 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1940); Home Finance Serv. v. Walmsley, 176 So. 415 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1937). It would seem then that the statute should only apply either
where there was no appraisement at all or where the appraisement did not
conform to the legal requirements. But see Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Dixon, 142
So. 2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (R.S. 13:4106 applied when court
lacked jurisdiction though appraisement was otherwise valid). In the instant
case there was judicial appraisement, 158 So. 2d at 228, and no irregularity
in the appraisement was alleged. The lack of authentic evidence was an in-
formality essentially unrelated both to the appraisement and to the policy
behind R.S. 13:4106. Furthermore, though the court indicates insufficient au-
thentic evidence rendered the entire executory proceeding, including appraise-
ment, absolutely null and of no legal effect, 158 So. 2d at 234, 235, there is
no authority for this proposition and the jurisprudence indicates such a defect
should be treated only as an irregularity giving rise to a relative nullity.
See note 25 infra. It is arguable, therefore, that for the purposes of R.S.
13:4106 there was a valid appraisement and that the court's holding as to
the deficiency judgment was incorrect.
5. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2631 (1960). See generally McMahon,
Historical Development of Executory Procedure in Louisiana, 32 TUL. L. REV.
555 (1958).
6. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2635 (1960) : "The plaintiff shall
submit with his petition the authentic evidence necessary to prove his right
to use executory process to enforce the mortgage or privilege. These exhibits
shall include authentic evidence of:
"(1) The note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the obligation secured
by the mortgage or privilege;
"(2) The authentic act of mortgage or privilege importing a confession of
judgment; and
"(3) Any judgment, judicial letters, order of court, or authentic act neces-
sary to complete the proof of plaintiff's right to use executory process.
"This requirement of authentic evidence is relaxed only in those cases, and
to the extent, provided by law."
The general provision of section 3 would include authentic evidence of a
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is not a judgment in a strict legal sense,7 and no service of
citation on the debtor is required.8 However, between the order
for issuance of a writ of seizure and sale and the issuance it-
self, a demand for payment, unless waived, must be served on
the debtor with notice that the writ will issue unless payment
is made within three daysY After seizure, notice of seizure
and sale must be served on the debtor ;10 this requirement is
not waivable. 11 Defenses to an executory proceeding may be
urged before the sale by suspensive appeal or injunction.12
Viewing executory process as a harsh and expeditious rem-
edy, the courts have exacted strict compliance with the formal
requirements imposed by law. 13 Lack of authentic evidence is
deemed a valid defense which may be urged by appeal or injunc-
tion. 14 When the debtor has failed to assert lack of authentic
evidence or other such irregularities in this manner, there is
confusion in the jurisprudence concerning his right to attack
the executory proceeding on such grounds after the property
transfer or endorsement of the mortgage note in accordance with prior juris-
prudence. Id. comment (d) ; Van Raalte v. The Congregation of the Mission,
39 La. Ann. 617, 2 So. 190 (1887) ; Miller, Lyon & Co. v. Cappel, 36 La. Ann.
264 (1884) ; Tufts, Fermor & Co. v. Beard, 9 La. Ann. 310 (1854) ; Brock v.
Messina, 200 So. 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
7. Pons v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 122 La. 156, 47 So. 449 (1908); Huber v.
Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 111 La. 747, 35 So. 889 (1904); Stapleton
v. Butterfield, 34 La. Ann. 822 (1882) ; Harrod v. Voorhies' Adm'x, 16 La. 254
(1840) ; Mack Trucks v. Dixon, 142 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). In
Harrod the court described an order of sale under executory process as follows:
"It issues without citation to the adverse party; it decides on no issue made
up between the parties, nor does it adjudicate, to the party obtaining it, any
right in addition to those secured by his notarial contract. . . . Such a decree
then can be viewed only as giving the aid of offices of justice, to execute
an obligation which, by law, produces the effects of a judgment, in relation
to the particular property mortgaged." 16 La. at 256-57.
8. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 2631, 2640 (1960).
9. Id. art. 2639.
10. Id. art. 2721.
11. Id. comment (b).
12. Id. art 2642. Prior to the enactment of this provision a devolutive appeal
from an' order of seizure and sale was theoretically possible, but if the prop-
erty was sold while the appeal was pending, the appeal would be dismissed
as presenting a moot question. E.g., Bank of LaFourche v. Barrios, 167 La.
215, 118 So. 893 (1928). For this reason devolutive appeal in this situation
was eliminated in the new provision and is no longer possible. LA. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE art. 2642, comment (c) (1960) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Kroger, 136 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
13. Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 So. 2d 305 (1954),
and cases cited therein; Miller, Lyon & Co. v. Cappel, 36 La. Ann. 264 (1884)
Ricks v. Bernstein, 19 La. Ann. 141 (1867).
14. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So. 2d
417 (1953). Prior to this decision there was a conflict in the jurisprudence
on whether lack of authentic evidence was properly urged in injunction pro-
ceedings. See generally Note, 14 LA. L. REv. 289 (1953). In Anzelmo the
court resolved the conflict in favor of the view that either injunction or appeal
was proper.
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has been sold. Doubt in this area has apparently arisen out of
the conflicting interests of the complaining debtor and the pur-
chaser at the judicial sale or subsequent purchasers. Although
it has occasionally been announced that the remedies of appeal
and injunction are exclusive, 15 numerous cases have permitted
actions to annul sales under executory process.' 6 Annulment
has been allowed on various grounds when the property was
sold to the mortgagee and was still in his possession. 1 7  In the
majority of these cases, however, there was either fraud on the
part of the mortgagee or failure to serve proper notice on the
15. Franek v. Brewster, 141 La. 1031, 1043, 76 So. 187, 192 (1917) ; Pons v.
Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 122 La. 156, 171, 47 So. 449, 454 (1908) (dictum) ; Miller
v. Peoples' Homestead & Say. Ass'n, 161 So. 656, 657-58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
That these pronouncements are too broad is implied by article 3543 of the
Louisiana Civil Code which clearly contemplates the possibility of annulling
a sale under executory process: "All informalities of legal procedure connected
with or growing out of any sale at public auction, . . . of real or personal prop-
erty, . . . shall be prescribed against by those claiming under such sale after
the lapse of two years from the time of making said sale ... " See note 26
infra for further discussion of this provision.
16. Reid v. Federal Land Bank, 193 La. 1017, 192 So. 688 (1939) ; Conti-
nental Sec. Corp. v. Wetherbee, 187 La. 773, 175 So. 571 (1936); McDonald
v. Shreveport Mut. Bldg. Ass'n, 178 La. 645, 152 So. 318 (1933) ; Ring v. Schil-
koffsky, 158 La. 361, 104 So. 115 (1925) ; Viley v. Wall, 154 La. 221, 97 So.
409 (1923) ; Brewer v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 128 La. 544, 54 So. 987 (1911) ; Pons
v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 122 La. 156, 47 So. 449 (1908); Huber v. Thompson,
46 La. Ann. 186, 14 So. 504 (1894); Killelea v. Barrett, 37 La. Ann. 865
(1885); Stapleton v. Butterfield, 34 La. Ann. 822 (1882) ; Germaine v. Mal-
lerich, 31 La. Ann. 371 (1879) ; Birch v. Bates, 22 La. Ann. 198 (1870) ; Far-
rell v. Klumpp, 13 La. Ann. 311 (1858) ; Tufts, Fermor & Co. v. Beard,
9 La. Ann. 310 (1854); Doherty v. Randazzo, 128 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1961).
Because an executory proceeding involves no judgment in the legal sense
of the term (see note 7 supra and accompanying text), an action to annul such
proceedings is not governed by articles 2001-2006 of the Code of Civil Procedure
dealing with actions to annul judgments. Cf. Pons v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 122
La. 156, 47 So. 449 (1908) (wherein it was held an action to annul sale under
executory process governed by prescriptive provision of article 3543 of the Civil
Code rather than the one-year prescription of article 613 of the Code of Practice
of 1870) ; Stapleton v. Butterfield, 34 La. Ann. 822 (1882) (same). There is
no legislative provision specifically authorizing such an action, but the courts
have recognized it as a direct action to annul a judicial sale and, in case of a
sale of an immovable, distinct from a petitory action. Reid v. Federal Land
Bank, 193 La. 1017, 1024, 192 So. 688, 690 (1939), and cases there cited.
17. Reid v. Federal Land Bank, 193 La. 1017, 192 So. 688 (1939) (proceed-
ings brought against mortgagor's succession though she was alive; no notice to
mortgagor) ; McDonald v. Shreveport Mut. Bldg. Ass'n, 178 La. 645, 152 So. 318
(1933) (improper advertisement of sale) ; Ring v. Schilkoffsky, 158 La. 361,
104 So. 115 (1925) (notice improperly served on wife instead of husband who
was living separately) ; Killelea v. Barrett, 37 La. Ann. 865 (1885) (tutor ad
hoc appointed to represent minors did not take oath; absolute nullity) ; Staple-
ton v. Butterfield, 34 La. Ann. 822 (1882) (mortgage absolutely null; fraud;
note enforced by holder with notice of nullity) ; Birch v. Bates, 22 La. Ann. 198
(1870) (no notice to mortgagor who was out of state at time of sale) ; Farrell
v. Klumpp, 13 La. Ann. 311 (1858) (no notice to mortgagor) ; cf. Acadian
Prod. Corp. v. Savanna Corp., 222 La. 617, 63 So. 2d 141 (1953) (sale under
writ of fieri facias; no notice to debtor; fraud).
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debtor,'8 suggesting that at the time of the sale the debtor had
no knowledge of the proceedings or the irregularities com-
plained of and thus could not have been reasonably expected to
urge his defense prior to the sale. When the property has been
sold to one other than the mortgagee, however, the courts have
generally not allowed the mortgagor to annul the sale on
grounds he could have urged prior to the sale. 19 An exception
to this rule was created in Viley v. Wall20 which held that an-
nulment could be obtained for fraud where the property was
still in the hands of an adjudicatee who had participated in
the fraud. Dictum in Viley which indicated that the rule ap-
plied to irregularities other than fraud21 was seized upon in
Doherty v. Randazzo,22 a court of appeal decision, to allow
18. See note 17 supra.
19. Continental Sec. Corp. v. Wetherbee, 187 La. 773, 175 So. 571 (1936)
Culotta v. Grosz, 173 La. 83, 136 So. 95 (1931); Ouachita Nat'l Bank v.
Shell Beach Constr. Co., 154 La. 709, 98 So. 160 (1923) ; Greenwood Planting &
Mfg. Co. v. Whitney Cent. Trust & Say. Bank, 146 La. 567, 83 So. 832 (1920) ;
Franek v. Brewster, 141 La. 1031, 76 So. 187 (1917) ; Pons v. Yazoo & M.V.
R.R., 122 La. 156, 47 So. 449 (1908) ; Huber v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndi-
cate, 111 La. 747, 35 So. 889 (1904) ; Wisdom v. Parker, 31 La. Ann. 52
(1879) ; Laforest v. Barrow, 12 La. Ann. 148 (1857); LeBlanc v. Rock, 84
So. 2d 629 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955) (dictum) ; Burden v. People's Homestead &
Say. Ass'n, 167 So. 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936) ; Miller v. People's Home-
stead & Say. Ass'n, 161 So. 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
20. 154 La. 221, 97 So. 409 (1923). The fraud proven in Viley was a
conspiracy between the mortgagee and the directors of a corporation to mortgage
corporate property and foreclose under executory process, the conspirators pur-
chasing the property themselves, thus defrauding the stockholders. The cor-
poration was allowed to annul the sale and recover the property in a derivative
stockholder's action.
A similar exception was made in Germaine v. Mallerich, 31 La. Ann. 371
(1879), where the widow of the mortgagor sued as tutrix of her daughter to
annul a sale under executory process brought against her husband while he
was out of the country. The husband died while abroad and the wife signed
the appraisement papers without authority. The court found the proceedings
null and allowed recovery of the property from a third-party purchaser. The
purchaser was found to be in bad faith since he knew of the husband's absence
and the wife's signature was patent on the face of the appraisement papers.
21. 154 La. 221, 229-30, 97 So. 409, 411-12: "Defendants contend that . . .
plaintiff did know of said proceedings [the executory proceedings] before the
sale, and, having failed either to appeal from the order of seizure and sale
or to enjoin the same, he is now barred from . . . annulling the mortgage and
sale; in other words, that the sole remedy in such proceedings is to appeal
or enjoin.
"We . . . have been unable to find any decision sustaining this view; nor
have defendants cited any case so holding where the property had not passed
out of the hands of the purchaser at such sale, and who was charged with
knowledge of and participation in the fraud and conspiracy, or other nullities
or illegalities upon which the same was attacked. . . . [No] provision of law
that we know of prevents him from attacking subsequently the sale upon the
ground of fraud, where the rights of no third person have intervened." (Empha-
sis added.)
22. 128 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), noted in 22 LA. L. REV. 845
(1962), in which views contrary to those herein expressed are advanced. In
Burden v. People's Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 167 So. 487 (La. App. 2d Cir.
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the only case found where annulment after sale has been al-
lowed solely on grounds of insufficient authentic evidence.2 3
Furthermore, since there was no fraud or lack of notice,2 4
Doherty goes beyond the majority of other cases allowing an-
nulment after sale on other grounds.
In the instant case, relying on the Doherty decision, the court
applied the Viley holding and dictum to permit the mortgagor
to annul the executory proceeding on grounds of lack of authen-
tic evidence, although he had made no attempt to appeal from
the order of seizure or to enjoin the sale.2 5 As in Doherty,
there was no fraud alleged, and the debtor had been served with
1936), factually similar to Doherty, the court refused to apply the Viley dictum
to a suit to annul for lack of authentic evidence because no fraud or knowledge
of the defect on the part of the purchaser was alleged.
23. But see Tufts, Fermor & Co. v. Beard, 9 La. Ann. 310 (1854), where
on devolutive appeal the court decreed the order of seizure null because of lack
of authentic evidence, though the property had already been adjudicated to a
third party. However, recovery of the property was denied because the pur-
chaser was not before the court. The court said: "Any relief to which the
appellant may be entitled for alleged irregularities after the judgment, must be
sought by a direct action." Ibid.
24. Allegations of insufficient notice was made by plaintiff, but the court
found it unsupported by evidence. 128 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
25. 158 So. 2d at 231-32. The present action was brought more than two
years after the date of the sale. See id. at 231. While no plea of prescription
was entered under article 3543 of the Civil Code (quoted note 15 supra), inter-
esting questions would have arisen had such been the case. Under article
3543 irregularities in or connected with public sales are "prescribed against
by those claiming under such sale after the lapse of two years from the time of
making said sale." (Emphasis added.) Defendant in the instant case was the
foreclosing creditor, not one claiming the property under the sale. No cases
have been found holding whether the article can be invoked by one other than
a claimant under the sale. In numerous cases, however, the courts have broadly
characterized the prescription under this article as one which "cures" the defects
in the proceedings. E.g., Phoenix Bldg. & Homestead Ass'n v. Meraux, 189 La.
819, 180 So. 648 (1938); Buillard v. Davis, 185 La. 225, 169 So. 78 (1936);
Rizzotto v. Grima, 164 La. 1, 113 So. 658 (1927) ; Walling v. Morefield, 33
La. Ann. 1174 (1881). From this it could be argued that any party having
an interest in the validity of the proceedings should be able to invoke article
3543. The prescription of two years, however, cures only irregularities con-
stituting relative nullities and not radical defects which render the proceedings
absolutely null. E.g., Acadian Production Corp. v. Savanna Corp., 222 La. 617,
63 So. 2d 141 (1953) ; Gaspard v. Coco, 208 La. 73, 22 So. 2d 829 (1945);
Pons v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 122 La. 156, 47 So. 449 (1908) ; Thibodeaux v.
Thibodeaux, 112 La. 906, 36 So. 800 (1904). In the instant case the court
indicated that lack of authentic evidence rendered the proceedings absolutely
null. 158 So. 2d at 228. No authority for this proposition has been found in the
jurisprudence, and in Skannal v. Hespeth, 196 La. 87, 198 So. 661 (1940), it was
specifically held that failure to attach notes and a copy of the mortgage to a
petition for executory proceedings was an informality cured by two years' pre-
scription. Furthermore, in Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, supra, it was held that
informalities cured under article 3543 were those "which do not reach matters
that are of the essence of those contracts, or prejudicially affect the substantial
rights of the parties." 112 La. 906, 913, 36 So. 800, 802 (1904). Mere lack
of authentic evidence would seem to meet this test. For a discussion of thejurisprudence under article 3543 see Comment, 13 TUL. L. REv. 615 (1939).
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proper notice of the proceedings. 2 6 Although the instant case
is distinguishable from Viley and Doherty in that the property
here had evidently been adjudicated to an innocent third party2 7
annulment for lack of authentic evidence when the property
was still in the hands of the mortgagee-adjudicatee. This is
not joined as a defendant, and there was no indication of his
knowledge of the defect in the proceedings, this distinction
seems immaterial since plaintiff did not seek to recover the
property, and thus the rights of the third-party purchaser were
not determined or immediately endangered. Thus, if the Viley
dictum and its application in Doherty were sound, the instant
decision would appear correct also. However, this essential
premise appears questionable.
While executory process is in a sense a harsh remedy be-
cause it is an ex parte proceeding without service of citation
on the debtor, this is mitigated by the fact that the debtor,
having executed a confession of judgment, has full knowledge
that the proceeding may be invoked against him. Furthermore,
he is given notice of the proceedings and has ample opportunity
to protect his interests by appeal or injunction. While it ap-
pears a reasonable safeguard to allow him to invoke insuf-
ficiency of authentic evidence as a defense to the action, it
should be noted that in most cases all the debtor will gain by
asserting such a defense is a delay; the creditor may still en-
force his claim by ordinary proceedings 28 in the absence of some
other valid defense such as fraud or invalidity of the under-
lying obligation. This being the case, it seems to be an un-
warranted liberality to an inattentive and negligent party to
allow him to annul executory proceedings solely for formal de-
ficiencies, when he has had notice of the proceedings and has
neglected to urge these defenses in the manner specifically pro-
vided by law, i.e., by appeal or injunction. Aside from the
Viley dictum and Doherty, the jurisprudence does not conflict
with this reasoning. As previously pointed out,29 most cases
which have permitted annulment after sale have involved either
fraud or lack of proper notice to the debtor, which might well
excuse his neglect. Furthermore, it is arguable that there is
no more reason for mere insufficiency of authentic evidence to
be grounds for annulling an executory proceeding than for in-
26. See note 1 supra.
27. See note 2 supra.
28. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2644 (1960).
29. See notes 17 and 18 supra and accompanying text.
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NOTES
sufficiency of evidence to be a basis for annulment of a judg-
ment.30 In both cases the defendant is given an opportunity
to contest the evidence brought. The requirement that evi-
dence in executory proceedings be in authentic form is appar-
ently a safeguard to assure the judge that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to bring the action and to protect against enforcement of
fabricated claims in defraud of the debtor's rights. Thus where
failure to comply strictly with the requirement is not accom-
panied by fraud on the court or the debtor, there seems little
reason to allow a subsequent annulment on such grounds.
If carried to its logical extreme, the trend set by the appli-
cation of the Viley dictum in Doherty and Tapp may lead to
a widespread practice of annulling judicial sales on minor
formal irregularities some time after the sale is completed.
Such a result would appear to be undesirable in prolonging
litigation 3 ' and adversely affecting the stability of judicial
sales and land titles.3 2 This danger seems to outweigh whatever
public interest there may be in protecting a debtor who has
negligently failed to protect himself. It is submitted that in a
suit brought by the debtor insufficient authentic evidence and
other such minor formal irregularities should be grounds for
annulling executory proceedings only when accompanied by
fraud or lack of notice to the debtor which excuses his failure
to appeal from or enjoin the sale.
George A. Kimball, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMMERCE CLAUSE - RESERVATION OF
LOCAL MILK MARKETS
Plaintiff, a Florida milk distributor, challenged orders of
the Florida Milk Commission which regulated sales between
30. That insufficiency of evidence is not ground for annulling a judgment
was held in Emuy v. Farr, 125 La. 825, 51 So. 1003 (1910).
31. This was one of the reasons given by Judge LeBlanc for his judgment
in the district court for defendant in the instant case. 158 So. 2d at 232.
32. Although in the instant case an automobile was involved, in Doherty
a sale of real estate was annulled. Even in a situation like Doherty, where
the property at the time of the action in nullity remains in the hands of the
mortgagee-adjudicatee who is charged with knowledge of the defect in the execu-
tory proceedings, annulment of the sale could do substantial damage to the pur-
chaser if he has put improvements on the property or is using it for business
purposes. In absence of fraud on his part it seems an unreasonable penalty to
require him to give up the property merely because of a formal irregularity
in the executory proceedings.
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